

Air Safety Week[®]

Celebrating
20 Years

Air Safety & Aviation Security Trends and Critical Analysis

Incorporating Airport Security Report

May 1, 2006
Washington, D.C.

Vol. 20 No. 18
www.aviationtoday.com

FAA Wants to Limit Fatigue Damage On Aging Commercial Planes

Aviation Safety

While the **Federal Aviation Administration's** (FAA) April 18 proposal to mitigate widespread fatigue damage (WFD) in aging transport aircraft through operational limits is intended to make the aviation industry more proactive with WFD problems, some aviation safety experts aren't so sure that will happen. But they give different reasons for their uncertainty.

In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) with a public comment period set to end on July 17, FAA proposes to "require that design approval holders [DAHs, or airplane manufacturers] establish operational limits on transport category airplanes. [DAHs] would also be required to determine if maintenance actions are needed to prevent [WFD] before an airplane reaches its operational limit."

Also, the agency says that "operators of any affected airplane would be required to incorporate the operational limit and any necessary service information into their maintenance programs. Operation of an affected airplane beyond the operational limit would be prohibited, unless an operator has incorporated an extended operational limit and any necessary service information into its maintenance program." The proposal would affect aircraft with maximum takeoff gross weights of 75,000 pounds or more.

Despite their initial reservations, former **National Transportation Safety Board** (NTSB) Chairman Jim Hall and Professor Chuck Eastlake of **Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University** say that the NPRM is a welcome development.

On the one hand, Hall, now a private consultant in Washington, D.C. with **Hall and Associates**, says that placing the onus of responsibility on the manufacturers and airlines is not the right focus.

(See WFD on p. 2)

Significant Regulatory Activity	4
Briefs: Venezuela, Atlanta	7
Accidents and Incidents	8

table of contents

Sometimes, 'Integrated' Airport Security Also Means 'Integrated' Vendors

Aviation Security

Increasingly, security firms are striving to meet U.S. airport operators' needs by installing the most integrated, comprehensive security systems possible. But their approaches vary.

In one instance, two video surveillance firms, St. Louis-based **Cernium** and Atlanta-based **VistaScape**, publicly announced April 18 that they are developing an integrated system to incorporate their respective signature products, Perceptrak and SiteIQ. Once the combined system is ready to roll, it will cover the entire airport grounds, from the front of the terminal to the outermost bounds of the perimeter.

But over at **Vidient Systems, Inc.**, its CEO, Brooks McChesney, says that the firm's Smart-Catch product is already doing all that by itself at **Salt Lake City Int'l Airport** (SLC), **San Diego Int'l** (SAN), **San Francisco Int'l** (SFO), and **Tallahassee Regional** (THL). Moreover, Vidient isn't looking to partner with other video surveillance firms, but with "other security-sensor companies that give us access and interfaces to devices that can extend our platform beyond video," McChesney tells *Air Safety Week*.

Meanwhile, the financial consulting firm of **Frost and Sullivan**, which follows the aviation-security industry (among others) said in early April that the worldwide market for layered, integrated airport security solutions is getting quite bullish.

(See Integration on p. 6)

WFD (Cont'd from p. 1)

The Bush administration, he tells *Air Safety Week*, is particularly averse to regulations and enforcement. We have a safe aviation system, he says, because it's generally recognized that the government has a fairly substantial role to play. But the current administration wants to get results by using too few people and too few resources.

Hall was former President Clinton's NTSB Chairman, initially getting confirmed as a board member in October 1993, about 10 months after the start of Clinton's first term. In May 1994, Hall was appointed as the board's vice chairman, then moved up to chairman roughly two months later. He resigned from the NTSB on Jan. 19, 2001, a few days before the beginning of the Bush presidency.

Moreover, Hall adds that the NPRM "swims against the tide of common sense" by expecting that aircraft designers or operators, with the company bottom line and economic self-interest getting in the way, will do the best job. "None of us does a very good job of policing ourselves."

Then too, all the data for monitoring aircraft safe-

ty is supposed to originate with manufacturers, Hall adds. This presents a certain "chilling factor" from the point of view of manufacturers, who may be reluctant to release some information or respond as FAA wants, because of litigation concerns.

In a related development, the **Flight Safety Foundation** commended the council of the **International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)** at its annual European safety seminar in March, for approving provisions intended to prevent safety information from being used in legal proceedings against operational personnel. Before taking effect, however, the provisions would have to be adopted as national laws and regulations by ICAO member states.

Still, Hall adds, FAA's proposal could work if it's "monitored correctly." Everyone concerned, not just FAA, will have to stay on top of how it pans out.

Meanwhile, Eastlake can't figure out what the NPRM would change. DAHs always have had the responsibility of determining the operational lives of specific aircraft and determining the proper maintenance schedules. "My primary impression is this NPRM is asking for things that have been done for decades," he

When Safety Information Doesn't Get to Operators

In its April 18 proposal on widespread fatigue damage in transport planes (see accompanying story), FAA says that design approval holders (DAHs) sometimes don't release data in a timely matter so airlines can efficiently respond to safety regulations. FAA gives five historical examples of this, which are reprinted below.

Thrust reversers, where it took 10 years to develop some service information airworthiness directive-related items;

Class D to Class C cargo conversions, where one type certificate (TC) holder did not develop the necessary modifications in time to support operator compliance and where several operators were unable to obtain timely technical support and modification parts from supplemental TC holders;

The Reinforced Flight Deck Door Program, where most operators had substantially less than the one-year compliance time originally anticipated because of delays in developing and certifying the new designs;

The Repair Assessment Rule, where some operators were required to develop their own data for FAA approval in order to meet the rule's compliance date; and

The Structural Repair Manuals, where operators are still awaiting DAH action to perform damage tolerance evaluations and establish inspections, even though the DAH committed to completing this activity by 1993. ■

To: Access Intelligence, LLC
P.O. Box 8927
Gaithersburg, MD U.S.A. 20898-8927
+1/301/354-2101 • 888/707-5812 • FAX: +1/301/309-3847
E-mail: clientservices@accessintel.com

NC/RC

Please enter renew the following subscriptions:

- Air Safety Week – 1 year for \$1097 (48 issues)
 Regional Aviation News – 1 yr. for \$997 (48 issues)
 Aircraft Value News – 1 year for \$1097 (25 issues)

MasterCard VISA AMEX Discover

Card No. _____ Exp. Date _____

Signature _____

Name _____

Title _____

Organization _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ ZIP _____

Phone _____ Fax _____

E-mail Address: _____

Air Safety Week

ISSN 1044-727X



Editor-In-Chief: David Evans

devans@accessintel.com

Editor: Bob Grupé

bgrupe@accessintel.com

Contributing Editor: John Sampson

Director of Marketing:

Jennifer Green-Holmes

jgreenhomes@accessintel.com

VP/Group Publisher: Jennifer Schwartz

Divisional President: Heather Farley

President CEO: Don Pazour

For Advertising Call Jennifer Green-Holmes: +1-301-354-1696

Send press releases to:

Bob Grupé, Editor

FAX: +1-301-762-4196, bgrupe@accessintel.com

Subscription: \$1097 per year (outside North America add \$99 for air mail; in CO, MD and TX, please add applicable sales tax). Reproduction of this newsletter in whole, or part, without prior written consent of Access Intelligence, LLC is prohibited. Federal copyright law prohibits unauthorized reproduction by any means and imposes fines up to \$100,000 for violations. To order reprints contact Darla Curtis, 301/354-1709, or email at dcurtis@accessintel.com. For photocopy or reuse requests: 800-772-3350 or info@copyright.com. For subscription information, see the attached coupon. Subscription and business offices: 4 Chokey Cherry Road, 2nd Floor, Potomac, MD 20850. Phone: +1-301-354-2000.

tells *Air Safety Week*.

Eastlake has been involved with aircraft structural design for about 40 years, originally for **General Electric** and the **U.S. Air Force**, and has taught the subject for 28 years.

Especially since the 1988 **Aloha Airlines** accident and the **Swissair** accident in the mid 1990s, such an action is “unbelievably overdue,” Hall says. The need for more attention in this area is obvious. Hopefully, the proposal at least serves to establish a “more comprehensive framework” than what exists now.

FAA cites the Aloha accident, in which an 18-ft. section of the upper fuselage of a Boeing 737 separated from the airplane on an inter-island hop, and for which the NTSB said WFD was a cause, as something of a watershed event for growing WFD concerns. Since that accident, WFD “appears to have played a role in several safety incidents involving large transport airplanes, although there has not been a catastrophic accident directly attributable to WFD.”

For his part, Eastlake believes that manufacturers, operators and others may state during the public comment period that they already do much of what FAA is calling for in the NPRM. Thus, as the agency has done in many prior cases, the final rule may be very different from the NPRM. Or, if it finds nothing to fix, FAA also may decide it doesn't need any new rulemaking.

But FAA says that its “existing requirements, even those that incorporate the latest mandatory changes introduced to combat structural degradation due to WFD, creates a risk of structural failure and related accidents because the requirements are inadequate to preclude WFD.”

Therefore, “we need a proactive approach [to] address conditions affecting safe flight that we know can happen—before they happen. This approach would require persons to analyze the causes of WFD in relation to the entire airplane and to analyze repairs, alterations, and modifications installed on the airplane.”

Moreover, the agency feels that a more proactive approach has long been hampered by the fact that airlines are obliged to take new safety actions, while the manufacturers are not required to produce the necessary data and documentation to make the airlines' efforts more efficient and less costly.

To back up this point, FAA sites five examples involving such components as thrust reversers and reinforced flightdeck doors where carriers have had to develop new procedures and make repairs with little or no help from the designers, and thus having to reinvent the wheel by conducting their own research and data-collection procedures. (*The full text of these examples are in the box on p. 2.*)

FAA also notes that some DAHs have committed to providing the agency with data to aid in aircraft certification, but have missed the submittal deadlines by up to 13 years.

But on this same point, Eastlake says, “That's not my experience.” Rather, he's had 30 years experience of witnessing manufacturers doing fatigue testing of wings, fuselages, and entire aircrafts.

Also, as an instructor, he's taught students for years how to calculate the fatigue-related operational life of various aircraft. Even though he's never worked as a specialist in structural fatigues or fractures, Eastlake says that it's always been his impression that operational-life predictions need to be done mathematically. Furthermore, critical pieces of these calculations have to be based on actual aircraft testing. When an aircraft reaches that mathematically calculated point, then it needs to be taken out of service.

It's also part of Eastlake's understanding that extensions of aircrafts' operational lives have been a possibility for years, although they are rare. The main reason for this is that the inspection schedules become too expensive.

As some media outlets reported, FAA estimates that its proposal would cost the industry \$360 million. But left out of those accounts is the fact that these costs would be spread over 20 years. The agency also states that “the present value benefits” of the proposal will total \$809 million due to accident prevention and a reduction in unscheduled maintenance and repairs, also accrued over the same 20-year time period. Moreover, out of the \$360 million in total costs, only 10 percent of that would be incurred by airplane manufacturers. The remainder would be borne by operators.

Normally, one would assume that the \$360-million figure should be subtracted from the \$809-million figure to arrive at a total \$449 million economic benefit over the next two decades. FAA did not respond to *Air Safety Week's* requests for clarification.

Another part of the NPRM that deserves a public airing, Eastlake says, would enhance current regulations, which only require that manufacturers analyze the fatigue-based operational life of a part that has a single flaw or a single crack. FAA now has proposed a similar but more detailed analysis, with the assumption that one part can have more than one crack.

The full NPRM is in the April 18 *Federal Register* (FR Doc. 06-3621; Docket No. FAA-2006-24281) starting on p. 19928. It also can be downloaded at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/fedreg/frcont06.html. ➔

>>Contacts: Jim Hall, Hall and Associates, (202) 312-0600; Chuck Eastlake, Embry-Riddle, (386) 226-6000; Walter Sippel, FAA, (425) 227-2774<<

Significant Regulatory Activity

Turbofan engines: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) – **General Electric Co. (GE)** CF6-50C series turbofan engines.

April 17, 2006 FR Doc. E6-5645 Docket No. FAA-2006-24171

This proposed airworthiness directive (AD) would require reworking the forward fan stator case and installing a fan module secondary containment shield. There have been reports of uncontained fan blade failures causing damage and separation of airplane hydraulic lines. FAA wants to prevent uncontained fan blade failures, which can result in separation of airplane hydraulic lines and damage to critical airplane systems.

There are 226 of these engines installed on airplanes of U.S. registry; repairs per engine could come to about \$200 in labor and \$9,451 in parts.

Comments are due June 16.

>>Contacts: GE, (513) 552-3272; Karen Curtis, FAA, (781) 238-7192<<

Turbofan engines: Proposed rule, withdrawal – **Rolls-Royce plc (RR)** RB211 trent 800 series turbofan engines.

April 17, 2006 FR Doc. E6-5666 Docket No. 97-ANE-09

The proposed rule, originally issued in the Nov. 2, 1999, Federal Register, would have required initial and repetitive inspections of the angled drive upper shroud, the intermediate gearbox housing (IGH), and the external gearbox lower bevel box (LBB) housing, and initial and repetitive master magnetic chip detector (MCD) inspections. Since issuing that proposed rule, Rolls-Royce notified FAA that after reviewing the service experience and the original actions taken, the unsafe condition no longer exists. So, FAA withdraws the rule.

Contact: Christopher Spinney, FAA, (781) 238-7175<<

Widespread Fatigue Damage: NPRM – Aging Aircraft Program.

April 18, 2006 FR Doc. 06-3621 Docket No. FAA-2006-24281

(See story on p. 1, and related NPRM on next page – FR Doc. 06-3758)

Fatigue cracks: NPRM – **Boeing** 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes.

April 18, 2006 FR Doc. E6-5723 Docket No. FAA-2006-24496

This AD would require repetitive inspections to detect cracks in the vertical beam webs of the body station (BS) 178 bulkhead, and corrective actions. This also would require a terminating modification for the repetitive inspections. Fatigue cracks in certain vertical beam webs could result in loss of structural integrity of the BS 178 bulkhead, and consequently could impair the operation of the control cables for the elevators, speed brakes, and landing gear, or could cause a loss of cabin pressure.

This would affect 1,172 U.S. airplanes; repairs would cost \$320 for each inspection per inspection cycle per airplane and, for preventative modifications, between \$20,160 and \$32,820 per airplane depending on the configuration.

Comments are due June 2.

>>Contacts: Boeing, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; Howard Hall, FAA, (425) 917-6430<<

Engines: NPRM – **Pratt & Whitney** PW4077D, PW4084D, PW4090, and PW4090-3 turbofan engines.

April 18, 2006 FR Doc. E6-5843 Docket No. FAA-2006-24034

This pertains to engines that were reassembled with certain previously used high pressure compressor (HPC) exit brush seal assembly parts and certain new or refurbished HPC exit diffuser air seal inner lands. This proposed AD would require replacing the HPC exit inner and outer brush seal packs with new brush seal packs, or replacing the HPC exit brush seal assembly with a new assembly. There has been a report of oil leaking into the high pressure turbine (HPT) interstage cavity and igniting, leading to an uncontained failure of the 2nd stage turbine air seal and engine in-flight shutdown.

There are 76 affected U.S. airplanes; repairs would cost \$100,017 per airplane.

Comments are due June 19.

>>Contacts: Pratt & Whitney, (860) 565-8770; Antonio Cancelliere, FAA, (781) 238-7751<<

Engine mounts: Final rule – Boeing 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-200C, 747-200F, 747-300, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes.

April 21, 2006 FR Doc. 06-06-3796 Docket No. FAA-2005-23441

This AD supercedes a prior one that requires repetitive detailed and ultrasonic inspections of the thrust links of the rear engine mounts for any crack or fracture, and corrective actions. The new AD requires repetitive replacement of the thrust links with new or overhauled thrust links, which ends the repetitive detailed and ultrasonic inspections. This results from the finding of fractured and cracked forward lugs of the rear engine mount thrust link on the number one strut on two airplanes. Such conditions could lead to the loss of the load path for the rear engine mount bulkhead and damage to other primary engine mount structure, which could result in the in-flight separation of the engine from the airplane.

There are about 100 affected U.S. airplanes; inspections would cost about \$520 per airplane per inspection cycle, and replacements would cost \$41,684 per airplane per inspection cycle.

This AD becomes effective May 26.

>>Contact: Boeing, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; Ivan Li, FAA, (425) 917-6437<<

Turboshaft engines: Final rule, request for comments – Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC) PW535A turboshaft engines.

April 21, 2006 FR Doc. 06-3765 Docket No. FAA-2006-24117

This AD applies to these engines that have serial numbers lower than DC0241, and with hydromechanical fuel control (HFC) part number 819735-4, 819735-5, or 819735-6 installed. This AD requires inspection and verification of the proper adjustment of the ratio unit setscrew adjustment of installed HFC units. There have been incidents of PW535A turboshaft engines experiencing a lack of response to the power lever input during attempted engine acceleration, due to an incorrect adjustment of the HFC ratio unit setscrew. FAA wants to prevent lack of engine response to power lever input, which could cause a single or dual engine in-flight shutdown.

There is no cost data given.

The is effective May 8, and comments are due June 20.

>>Contact Pratt & Whitney Canada, 800-268-8000; Ian Dargin, FAA, (781) 238-7178<<

Damage tolerance data: NPRM – Transport category airplanes.

April 21, 2006 FR Doc. 06-3758 Docket No. FAA-2005-21693

Airworthiness standards are being proposed that would require design approval holders to make available to operators damage tolerance data for repairs and alterations to fatigue critical airplane structure (*see story starting on p. 1*). This proposal is needed to support operator compliance with the requirement to include damage tolerance inspections and procedures in their maintenance programs, and to enable operators to take into account the possible adverse effects of repairs and alterations on fatigue critical structure. A separate notice (FR Doc. 06-3757) requests comments on a proposed advisory circular (AC) 120-XX, which sets forth an acceptable means, but not the only means, of demonstrating compliance with the provisions of the airworthiness standards in the first notice.

Comments on the airworthiness standards are due July 20; comments on AC 120-XX are due June 20.

>>Contacts: (on the airworthiness standards) Greg Schneider, FAA (425) 227-2116, greg.schneider@faa.gov; (on AC 120-XX) Kenna Sinclair, FAA, (425) 227-1556<<

Control surfaces: Notice of proposed interim guidelines, request for comments – Interim guidelines for certification and continued airworthiness of unbalanced control surfaces with freeplay and other nonlinear features.

April 24, 2006 FR Doc. 06-3858 Policy Statement No. ANM-05-115-019

This memorandum clarifies FAA guidance on the design, certification, and continued airworthiness of control surfaces that rely on retention of restraint stiffness for flutter prevention. These control surfaces typically do not have added mass balance, but there are some that are partially mass balanced for which the guidelines would also apply. This memorandum provides acceptable means of establishing and certifying freeplay limits and inspection procedures, provides guidance for managing freeplay over the airplane service life, and provides a means of finding compliance for control system designs in which failure can result in a nonlinear aeroelastic configuration and limit cycle oscillation (LCO). This memorandum provides interim guidelines and standardized methods of compliance that address the inadequacies of current guidance, until the FAA revises the applicable guidance contained in AC 25.629-1A.

Comments are due May 25.

>>Contact: Gerald Lakin, FAA, (425) 227-1187, gerald.lakin@faa.gov<<

Engine air seal assemblies: NPRM – Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7R4G2 turbofan engines.

April 26, 2006 FR Doc. 06-3922 Docket No. FAA-2006-23742

This proposed AD would require replacing the old configuration 2nd stage high pressure turbine (HPT) air seal assembly with a new design assembly that increases cooling air flow. There has been a report of an uncontained failure of the 2nd stage air seal assembly, caused by the air seal assembly brace disengaging from the air seal, due to insufficient cooling air flow. Problems in this area could lead to engine in-flight shutdown and damage to the airplane.

This would affect 176 engines installed on airplanes of U.S. registry. The total cost in labor and parts to U.S. operators would be \$1,851,520.

Comments are due June 26.

>>Contacts: Pratt & Whitney, (860) 565-8770; Kevin Donovan, FAA, (781) 238-7743<<

NTSB Action

What: “Executive summary” of a safety report (to be released later) discussed at April 25 meeting.

Based on: Four major accident investigations from 1999 to 2004, in which FAA’s certification process to determine compliance with airworthiness standards were in question. The full report will include NTSB’s rationale for the three new recommendations for FAA (which follow).

Recommendations: 1) Compile a list of safety-critical systems derived from the safety assessment process for each type certification project, and place in the official type certification project file the documentation for the rationale, analysis methods, failure scenarios, supporting evidence, and associated issue papers used to identify and assess safety-critical systems. 2) Amend the advisory materials associated with 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 25.1309 to include consideration of structural failures and human/airplane system interaction failures in the assessment of safety-critical systems. 3) Adopt SAE ARP 5150 into 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 21, 25, and 121 to require a program for the monitoring and ongoing assessment of safety-critical

systems throughout the life cycle of the airplane. Safety-critical systems will be identified as a result of recommendation 1. Once in place, use this program to validate that the underlying assumptions made during design and type certification about safety-critical systems are consistent with operational experience, lessons learned, and new knowledge.

Integration (Cont'd from p. 1)

Such solutions “will require a combination of technologies ranging from those used for the outermost part of the perimeter to internal operations at the command, control and communications center,” the firms says. Also, “innovative technologies, particularly intelligent video surveillance systems, are becoming an integral part of mainstream airport security.” Such a market analysis fits both the Cernium-VistaScape partnership and Cernium’s solo game plan.

The former also can be seen as a marriage of two complementary technologies. Whereas Cernium’s Perceptrak goes close-in for a threat analysis, VistaScape’s SiteIQ scans for the big picture.

Perceptrak’s strength is a form of “behavior recognition” that can not only be applied to people, but also to vehicles. It detects 16 different types of “behavior,| including the old stand-by that earlier systems focused on — wrong-way motion — as well as newer behavioral categories, such as various forms of erratic movement.

SiteIQ detects and track objects — either vehicles or people — over large outdoor spaces, to see if they are violating pre-set user-defined security zones. Last year, SiteIQ was installed at Boston’s **Logan Int’l** (BOS), where the system is keeping an eye on ships in the harbor, as well as on vehicles and people.

Technically, the difference between the two technologies comes down to the number of pixels used. Perceptrak needs a lot to properly analyze the behavior of people and objects in the video image. SiteIQ can get by with just a few pixels, or a small fraction of the total image, to detect something suspicious out on the edge of the tarmac, Cernium CEO Craig Chambers explains to *Air Safety Week*.

So, combining Cernium’s “micro” focus with VistaScape’s “macro” emphasis should provide airport operators with an ongoing, up-to-the minute security picture, the CEOs of both firms agree. In the many talks Cernium has had with its customers and potential customers, it’s become clearer that what airport operators really want is one system with multiple capabilities, VistaScape CEO Glenn McGonnigle tells *Air Safety Week*.

Otherwise, if the system for accessing the perimeter is completely distinct from the access-control system and both are separate from something else, this results in “swivel chair integration” problems for the human operators, McGonnigle says.

Chambers cites a well publicized incident from a few years ago in New York, when some recreational boaters with some kind of problem or emergency

stumbled ashore and wandered onto the tarmac. They also went unnoticed by airport authorities for a long time. But under a scenario like a Cernium-VistaScape system, the perimeter breach would have been detected immediately, and shortly after, airport management would had information indicating that the intruders were acting more like lost souls than like terrorists.

Or, instead of proceeding from macro to micro information, a new event might first get picked up by the close-in behavioral analysis data, as with the detection of a passenger’s wrong-way motion at a concourse exit, McGonnigle says. Such data then needs to be quickly coupled with a bigger picture, like what exact exit and concourse the behavior is occurring at.

Meanwhile, Vidient’s McChesney agrees that integrated systems are what airport operators need. But “Cernium and Vistascape’s partnership tells me that they acknowledge that they lack the capacity and technology to undertake an entire airport by themselves.”

Both Cernium’s Chambers and VistaScape’s McGonnigle declined to respond to McChesney.

The problem many vendors are having is that they have long focused on one piece of the technological pie or another, McChesney adds. But Vidient has “been working feverishly” to do just that. In Tallahassee, the firm integrated data from a variety of sensors — not just video — and is fused it all onto a common “video backbone,” McChesney says. So, command-center personnel in the center do not have to toggle between data streaming in from two or more situations to figure out what’s actually going on.

“From day one,” Vidient has worked at being able to combine different types of detection onto a common platform. Right now, “We believe we’re the only ones that can do the entire facility,” he says.

Another point McChesney makes is that a fully integrated airport security system is not just video. This includes data from sources such as GPS, worker card readers, biometrics, and license-plate recognition, to name a few.

For his part, McGonnigle agrees that thorough surveillance is not just about video cameras. Many firms, including his own, he admits, have been a little guilty of over-hyping the potential benefits of video analytics used alone. But it’s becoming clearer that video is just one part of a comprehensive solution.

In a related development, the **Transportation Security Administration** (TSA) on April 12 distributed a “Request for White Papers for Airport Perimeter Security,” seeking the development of more innovative technologies and the support of \$4.7 million in new funding, according to the **Airports Council Interna-**

(See *Integration* on p. 7)

BRIEFS

● **An effective lobbying effort.** After several months of wrangling, the United States and Venezuela have avoided a standoff in which both nations would have restricted each others' commercial flights. Back in 1995, the **Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)** rated Venezuela as a Category 2 country under the agency's **International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA)** program. While most countries enjoy the relatively free reign of being under Category 1 to schedule, under Category 2, a country's carriers cannot use their aircraft or flight crews to enter U.S. airspace. Officially, Category 1 means that countries meet **International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)** standards; Category 2 means that they do not.

So recently, Venezuelan officials at several levels started making a lot of noise about the IASA restrictions, saying that their safety and security processes have changed a great deal in the intervening decade. Furthermore, unless the United States suddenly agreed with that assessment by April 25, Venezuela was going to prohibit flights entering its airspace from **Continental Airlines** and **Delta Air Lines, Inc.**, and place restrictions on **AMR Corp.**'s operations through **American Airlines**. So, four days before that deadline, on April 21, the U.S. Embassy in Caracas and FAA announced that Venezuela was in Category 1. FAA officially credited this change of heart to two ICAO assessments that showed improving conditions in Venezuela. It also was reported that FAA officials had recently visited the country. >>Contact: *FAA Public Affairs*, (202) 267-3883<< ■

● **Ouch.** A "suspicious device" uncovered at the checkpoint April 19 at **Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta Int'l Airport (ATL)** (*Air Safety Week, April 24, p. 5*), resulting in a couple of hours of service delays, turned out to be a "false" image. The TSA screener who first saw the device pushed a button to check if it was just a training image, but the system didn't respond that it was. So the alert went out, while officials tried to find the bag in question and its owner, who it turns out didn't exist. While the screener acted correctly (as TSA head Kip Hawley later publicly confirmed), **Delta Air Lines, Inc.** says the "software glitch" cost the airline \$1.3 million.

● **'Ships Passing in the Night'** ... is how FAA

Administrator Marion Blakey now describes her agency's current contract-negotiation stand-off with the controllers' union, the **National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)** (*Air Safety Week, Jan. 23, p. 1*). Blakey used that phrase in a April 25 letter to NATCA president, John Carr, four days earlier. Although it's been difficult lately ascertaining whether the talks are really on or off, Blakey's letter seems to indicate her impatience with the prospect of resuming them, and of her agency's determination to leave it up to Congress to determine what the next contract will look like.

In his April 21 letter, Carr urged Blakey to send her negotiators back to the table, with the promise of a "revised economic proposal" from NATCA. But Blakey responded to Carr, "At this late date, resuming collective bargaining makes little sense, particularly while you are simultaneously seeking to change the impasse procedure that Congress has rightly established." Blakey refers to the fact that federal law makes Congress the "binding arbitrator" of last resort in such disputes. FAA formally requested congressional intervention back on April 5. Blakey also responds to Carr, "While it was never my desire to send our dispute to Congress ... at this point that is the appropriate forum to assess the reasonableness of both sides' positions." >>The letters' full text are at http://www.faa.gov/about/contract_negotiations and <http://www.natca.org/mediacenter/press-release.aspx> under "Speaking of Letters."<< ■

● **A failure to communicate.** In response to a now infamous **Northwest Airlines** flight on June 29, 2004, in which 13 Middle Eastern men upset passengers and flight crew by going back and forth to the plane's lavatories and appearing to start a security incident or testing the response to one, the **Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG)** finds that DHS' internal communications over such incidents "needs improvement." OIG also says that both the **Federal Air Marshal Service** and the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** have the statutory authority to investigate such incidents, which could cause confusion. Those conclusions are about all that is contained in the two sentences comprising the public version of the "executive summary" of OIG's report, "Review of Department's Handling of Suspicious Passengers Aboard Northwest Flight 327." ■

Integration (Cont'd from p. 6)

tional-North America (ACI-NA). The white-paper submission deadline is rapidly approaching — on May 5. For more information, or to obtain a copy of the TSA request, ACI-NA recommends contacting Charles Chambers, cchamers@aci-na.aero, or Elle Han, ehan@aci-na.aero, who are both at (202) 293-8500.✈

>>Contacts: *Ken Vondrasek, Cernium aviation systems manager, (314) 968-5454 X103, kvondrasek@cernium.com; Wade Coleman, VistaScape communications, (678) 919.2363; wcoleman@vistascape.com; Jan Wiedrick-Kozlowski (communications for Vidient), 585-392-7878, jkozlowski@newventure.com.com<<*

ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS ¹				
DATE/SITE	AIRCRAFT & REGN	CIRCUMSTANCES	DEATH & INJURY	PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS ² <i>Imagery at www.iasa.com.au/010506.htm</i>
12 April Pittsburgh	Dash 8 of Piedmont Airlines	Relanded 28R & towed in after Hyd 1 failure. Two lines burned & sooted.	Nil / 28 pax +3 crew	Reg N808EX (op by US Airways Express). Flt 4532 had 2 hyd leak sites.
14 April 1455L Lubbock, Texas	C210F Reg N1966	Elec fire/flames/dense smoke after small explosion 5 mins after t/off. A/c landed in cotton-field & inverted.	1 inj	Reg N1966 destroyed by electrical fire - started behind inst panel. Pilot observed flames around his feet.
15 April ~2230L Alghero a/p, Italy	737 of Air One	Emergency landing Alghero after engine failure experienced en route.	Nil / 120 pax	Milan (Linate a/p) to Cagliari, Italy.
15 April Dublin, Ireland	737-800 of Ryanair	A/c diverted into Dublin after pilot forced to shut down engine/	Nil	Flight FR612 was from Derry, north. Ireland, to London's Stansted.
15 April 1615EDT Front Royal, Va.	CL600-2B19 of Atlantic SouthEast	F/A thrown from ceiling to floor when a/c struck turbulence at FL250.	1 serious inj / 50 o/b	Flt 4462 / N934EV. F/A had head & neck injuries & broken foot.
16 April ~0930L New Chitose, Japan	SAAB340 of Hokkaido AirSys	Flt 2860 made emerg landing after losing control of #1 propeller.	Nil	Flt 2860 Kushiro to Okadama a/p, Sapporo. Chafed wiring problem.
19 April 0655L Shanghai	777 of UAL A340 of SAS	Flt UA835 had TCAS event with the A340 while on descent Pudong a/p.	5 inj / 237 o/b	1 pax seriously injured on N216UA. Under investigation by Chinese CAAC.
20 April 2345EDT Bloomington, Ind.	U206G Reg N120HS	Crashed in fog half-mile short of runway during ILS 35 inst appch.	5 fatal / 5 o/b	Possible disorientation in unlandable instrument conditions.
20 April ~1700L Heathrow	A320 of British Midland	Flt BD338 returned LHR after crew unable to raise landing gear.	Nil	Reg G-MIDO LGCIU u/s (LG control interface unit). Headed to Teesside a/p.
21 April 2220L Atlanta	717-200 of AirTran	Flt 186 returned to Hartsfield- Jackson after lightning strike.	Nil / 116 pax + 5	Bound Washington, D.C., but struck soon after takeoff.
21 April ~1606L Tampa, Fla.	DC9-50 of NWA Flt NW880	A/c declared electrical emergency inbound, but landed without incident.	Nil	En rout to Memphis, Tenn., to Tampa, Fla.
21 April ~0700L San Jose, Calif.	MD80 of American	Returned San Jose after takeoff because of smoke in cockpit.	Nil / 142 o/b	Flt AA1204 for Dallas/Ft. Worth.
21 April Cairo, Egypt	A320 of Cyprus Airways	On approach, a/c collided with large bird, causing leading edge damage.	Nil / 116 pax	Larnaca, Cyprus to Cairo flight.
22 April Madrid, Spain	747-400 of Aero -Lineas Argentinas	Aircraft returned after declaring emerg for vibration after takeoff.	Nil	Flt AR1135 (Madrid, Spain, to Buenos Aires, Argentina).
22 April 2010L Munich, Germany	BAe 146-300 of Air Dolomiti	A/c returned to Munich following engine failure soon after takeoff.	Nil	Flt EN3992 (Munich to Bologna, Italy).
23 April ~2050L Rostov on Don Ru.	AN2 of Yugavia	Intoxicated pilot lost control on final approach & crashed near Tersky.	4 fatal / 5 o/b	...in the Buddenovsk district, Stavropol territory. Reg RF-00451.
23 April 2250Z Denver	747-400 of Lufthansa	747 was parking at gate when jetway struck by #1 engine.	Nil	Flt LH446 suffered what appeared to be minor damage. Frankfurt-Denver.
23 April 0456L N'Djamena, Chad	AN-74 of KSAMC	AN74TK-200 crashed near Chari River on 2nd appch to N'Djamena.	6 fatal / 6 o/b	Reg UR-74038 was on humanitarian aid flt from Tripoli via Sebha in Libya.
24 April 1145L Lashkar Ghah, Afgh	AN-32 of Valan Int'l Cargo	Plowed into homes on landing. A/c chartered by US State Dept officers.	2 dead / 8inj / 16 o/b	+3 dead / 5 hurt on ground. ZS-PDV veered to avoid vehicle entering r'way.
24 Apr 0512Z Phoenix	MD82 of American	Right wing of Flt AA2487 hit paving machine while taxiing in to ramp.	Nil	Reg N424AA suffered minor damage.
25 April Maracaibo, Venez.	757 of American	A/c returned to Maracaibo soon after takeoff for emerg landing.	Nil	Unknown cause. Flight bound for Miami.
25 April afternoon Stavanger, Norway	737-700 of SAS Reg LN-RPK	Catering truck struck left wingtip of aircraft under tow across ramp.	Nil	Substantial damage to leading edge of port wing.
26 April am Stavanger, Norway	737-33A of Norge Air Shuttle	Rolled backwards 500m into terminal building damaging elevator & stab.	Nil	Reg LN-KKS had no park brakes set nor chocks. Substantial damage.
26 April 0843L Heathrow	A319-131 of BA Flt BA853	Landed 27R Heathrow with smoke in cockpit after declaring mayday.	Nil	Reg G-EUOA (Prague to Heathrow). Avionics cooling fan seized.
27 April 1500L Tel Aviv, Israel	TU154 (privately owned)	Ben Gurion ATC staff called for IAF F16 escort when a/c failed to reply.	Nil / 170 pax	170 Christian pilgrims visiting from Russia. Hijack of inbound a/c suspected.
27 April day Manchester, UK	DC-10 of Biman Airways	A/c stopped on r'way with main-gear fire after uncoordinated landing.	Nil	Arr from Dhaka via Dubai. Some pax panic due to calls of "fire" in cabin.
27 April ~0400L St John's, Newfld	A340 of Air France AF010	Called St John's tower from 600nms out, advising diverting with eng 3 out.	Nil	Flt AF010 (Charles de Gaulle a/p, Paris, to JFK, N.Y.).
27 April Istanbul, Turkey	A340-311 of Turkish Airlines	Windscreen cracked over Munich & pilot returned 2.5 hrs to Istanbul.	Nil / 152 o/b	Reg TC-JDL "Ankara."
27 April 0430L Seeb a/p, Oman	A320 of GulfAir Flt GF274	Returned Muscat Oman after 40 mins - following engine failure.	Nil / 131 o/b	Landed after extended holding.

¹ Air carrier accidents, or other incidents involving serious failures or fatal injuries, investigated by aviation safety agencies of various nations.

² DISCLAIMER: These assessments are not intended to assert probable cause or liability, but rather are intended to provide insight pending publication of a final report of investigation. *Preliminary analysis by John Sampson - International Aviation Safety Association. (IASA)*